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THE ALLEVIATION OF 
SUFFERING AS THE GOAL 
OF PSYCHOLOGICAL CARE
Jordi Cabos a
Abstract: It would seem quite clear that what gives meaning to psy-
chological care is the alleviation of patient suffering. But this affirmation 
is not so evident in some cases. In fact, some psychological care practices 
overlook suffering. This article explores why suffering is overlooked in 
some of these practices: first of all, the search for a psychological care 
which is free from moral judgments; secondly, the incompatibility between 
suffering and the prevailing psychological care models and thirdly, the 
professionalisation of the relief of suffering. Finally, this paper reminds 
that the alleviation of suffering is the goal which gives meaning to any 
psychological care practice. 
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INTRODUCTION
Every activity is aimed at attaining a particular end, which is what 
gives it a meaning; a meaning in the sense of coherence between the begin-
ning and the end of an activity. In other words, the movement which 
causes an activity to start must be maintained until its end, in order to 
achieve its goal, which is what characterises it (Aristotle, 1985, pp. 131). 
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If this teleological representation is applied to psychological care, it 
should be clear that the meaning of psychological care practice should be 
deduced from why it starts in the first place and why it is maintained. In 
this context, psychological care practice is the human action that uses 
psychological knowledge to help people who suffer psychological prob-
lems. Psychological care practice (PCP) is understood here as all the care 
practices which deal directly with patient suffering and where psycho-
logical care has a crucial role. 
We are aware of the difficulty of giving such a definition for so many 
manifold care practices which are aimed at providing psychological care. 
In fact, we understand that psychological care is mainly carried out by 
psychology, in the sense that psychology is not only the activity of psy-
chologists but also of all care professionals whose work is aimed at achiev-
ing psychological care.1 When we speak about PCP, we refer not only 
to clinical psychology, but also to any care profession which is orientated 
to offer a care relationship, such as psychotherapy, as well as certain 
medicine, social work and nursing practices, among others. 
If we take a look at what initiates these practices, they should start 
because of the fact that there is a person who suffers and is in need of help 
(Jackson, 1999, p. 37). The starting movement of PCP is the movement 
which helps the sufferer. If this is its initial movement, PCP only has a 
meaning if its end is the relief, the management and the understanding of 
patient suffering.2 In this context, the term ‘suffering’ is used as a psycho-
logical experience associated with a perception of a threat of self-destruc-
tion (Cassell, 1982, p. 640). The PCP guidelines should be considered as 
a question that tries to alleviate patient suffering. Only from this point 
of view is it possible to achieve a guideline for any idea of psychological 
care (Reich, 1989, p. 93). 
Sachs has proposed that the main goal of any PCP should be the relief 
of suffering, but this author equates it with the search for happiness (Sachs, 
1  In addition, we are aware of the controversy implied by the concept of psycho-
logical care, which is not the objective of this paper. This work assumes that psycho-
logical care is mostly the professional action which seeks the alleviation of suffering. 
And although psychological care may be considered to be something more than relief, 
this paper assumes that psychological care is exclusively the alleviation of suffering 
because this should be the minimum which any psychological care practice should 
provide.
2  It does not mean that there is only one way to achieve it. Actually, this goal of 
relieving patient suffering can be achieved by different procedures. 
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1989, p. 145). For us, one thing is the alleviation of suffering, which is 
depriving the individual of his autonomy because of some psychological 
problem, and another thing is the independent search for happiness. We 
consider a psychological problem a situation which provokes suffering in 
a way that it affects autonomy, autonomy being the individual’s ability 
to freely define himself with specific criteria (Reich, 1989, p. 87).
In short, what we propose is that the PCP goal should be the relief of 
the autonomy-limiting suffering. The PCP intervention should be the 
condition of being able to search for happiness, but not something which 
provides it directly. So, the hypothesis defended is that the PCP goal is 
the alleviation, the management and the understanding of the autonomy-
limiting suffering. 
But before arriving at this point, a brief historical overview which 
could explain clearer why nowadays it is still necessary to insist on our 
suggestion. In this article, the brief historical overview is a study of the 
psychological care history and its relations with its current situation. This 
overview will be useful to show clearly how and why the relief of patient 
suffering is overlooked in some cases. 
THE ALLEVIATION OF SUFFERING AND PSYCHOLOGICAL  
CARE
In spite of the fact that it could seem quite obvious to say that the 
psychological care goal is the relief of suffering, it is not clear at all among 
some professionals. 
From the field of medicine, Cassell has pointed out that the medical 
technology progress has provoked an oversight of the professional obliga-
tion of relieving patient suffering (Cassell, 1982). According to this author, 
this oversight is due to the fact that the concept of person has lost its 
significance. Because of its specialisation, medicine has abandoned any 
notion that could be subjective and not directly linked with the body. 
This assumption had as a result medicine rejecting the concept of 
person, which was too abstract. But at the same time, patient suffering 
was thrown out with the concept of person. In other words, medicine, 
mostly concerned with body dysfunctions, forgot patient suffering because 
of its subjective nature. In the cases it did pay some attention to it, it was 
in the quality of something associated to physical pain, something control-
lable by medicines and pain-killers. 
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Likewise in nursing, Ferrell and Coyle have recently pointed out that 
the medical advances in this field promote models which exclude the 
person and its suffering. Instead of alleviating suffering, these new medi-
cal models contribute to neglecting it (Ferrell and Coyle, 2008, p. 6). 
Generally, it has been considered that the concept of person, due to 
its subjective nature, must be dealt with as a mental category and its study 
must be performed by the science of mind (Cassell, 1982, p. 640). But if 
psychology can be considered the science of mind, it has also neglected 
the concept of person (Barresi, 1999, p. 96).
Although certain humanistic psychological approaches have used this 
notion (Rogers, 1963, p. 18), they have done so by referring to it as a 
psychological category. For many authors, these humanistic points of 
view repeat, like other psychological schools, a theoretical ideal which 
conceals the real person in grief (Barresi, 1999, p. 79). From this human-
istic point of view, the meaning of being a person –and therefore the 
meaning of the concept of person as well– depends on the success of the 
treatment. 
To sum up, neither clinical sciences nor behavioural sciences have a 
procedure to deal with all the complexity of suffering (Kleinman, 1988, 
p. 28). Many of the psychological care theories have been developed in 
terms of scientific explanations, such as mechanisms of mind, symptoms, 
or disorders (Bray, 2010); in fact, some authors have noticed that if they 
do mention patient suffering, it is only indirectly. In a way, this exclusion 
of patient suffering puts an end to the moral purpose postulated by these 
type of practices at the beginning of the 20th century (Miller, 2004, X). 
Some authors have propounded that this exclusion of patient suffering is 
absolutely inadmissible in PCPs (Miller, 2004, p. 43). 
Thereby, some PCPs have dealt with the alleviation of suffering as 
something implied within it, but, in fact, it is not clear if they provide it 
(Miller, 2005, p. 323). Sometimes suffering remains as a category which 
psychological care professionals believe to know what it is, but they 
neither define nor question it. In other words, as some authors have 
pointed out, suffering is not a priority for some PCPs and few authors 
have actually dared to really get into it (Goldberg, 1986; Urraca, 1995, 
p. 57). 
This oversight of suffering in some PCPs could be explained by three 
reasons: first of all, because of the intention of developing a psychological 
care which is free from moral judgments; secondly, because of the incom-
patibility between the concept of suffering and the main psychological 
Ramon Llull Journal_05_2014.indd   208 29/05/14   11:44
209CABOS
THE ALLEVIATION OF SUFFERING AS THE GOAL OF PSYCHOLOGICAL 
CARE 
care models; thirdly, due to the extreme difficulty and evolution of the 
professionalisation of the alleviation of suffering. 
THE SEARCH FOR A PSYCHOLOGICAL CARE WITH NO MORAL 
JUDGMENTS
With the intention of preventing damage, some PCP members have 
avoided including moral judgments in their practice. It seems that this 
was a general consensus they were able to achieve. But this consensus 
implied neglecting other essential phenomena (Miller, 2004, p. 49). 
It is true that any care practice implies many moral judgments. But 
these judgments are more important in psychological care. This is so 
because psychological suffering needs to be detected by a moral criterion 
which can assess it; suffering is always linked to a moral dimension which 
allows it to provide a meaning (Rawlinson, 1986, p. 49). 
First of all, it is impossible to deal with psychological problems on a 
theoretical level without any kind of moral consideration. It is quite dif-
ficult to justify the statements about psychological problems due to the 
fact that there is no decisive empirical reality on which they can be based. 
The majority of the psychological statements elucidated about mental 
reality is not proven at all and can actually be formulated in another way. 
Secondly, every explanation of suffering conceals an anthropological 
aspect which assumes a concrete idea of the human being. In other words, 
any interpretation of suffering adopts an idea about how, why and what 
suffering is. When someone interprets suffering, it is always from the 
point of view of a specific idea of good and evil, about what must be done 
and what not. 
Thirdly, every interpretation of suffering requires a person to express 
it. This interpretation is proposed by an individual world view (Weltan-
schauung) which guides the whole care process. In fact, due to the asym-
metric nature of the relation between the professional and the patient, 
this interpretation cannot avoid being moral. The patient is in a weak 
position when compared with the professional. The patient does not have 
a solid criterion with which reality can be judged and he has no other 
option but to accept the professional’s interpretation of suffering (of his 
own problem). So, according to Miller (2004), a relevant moral compo-
nent must be acknowledged here. On the contrary, the non-recognition 
of these different ethical controversies threatens its sense. 
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For some authors, what is currently happening with Psychology is 
exactly what happened with religion in the past. In an attempt to avoid 
the loss of credibility experienced by the theological language, psychol-
ogy apparently offers a neutral language with which the human behaviour 
could be understood. By using the authority of science, it has proposed 
certain concepts which aspired to be free from ideology; concepts that, 
all in all, are anything but free (Hunter, 2000, p. 7). 
Psychology has gained power within institutions. This power is char-
acterised by Hunter as a psychological regime, which stands for a complex 
net of ideas that try to propagate a strategy to understand morality, learn-
ing and living (Hunter, 2000, pp. 7-9). At this point, one could add the 
fact that this psychological regime also affects the different PCPs. 
In addition, the question of theodicy which was an object of study for 
philosophers and theologians for centuries and is now reduced to psycho-
logical categories, such as mental disorder, anxiety or stress. The concept 
of the evil has been transformed into psychopathology, sociopathology 
and personality disorders. In fact, this new psychological language mini-
mises the problematic dimension of the human being (Spinelli, 2000, 
p. 562) and raises a lot of ethical questions. 
Like Illouz has pointed out, psychology has replaced religion. Accord-
ing to psychology, suffering is to be treated as a problem of the mind 
which must be dealt with by experts. For this sociologist, clinical psychol-
ogy is the first cultural system which discards the problem of theodicy 
and deals with it as if it were the result of some individual mind dysfunc-
tion. Therefore, it satisfies one of religion’s objectives: it achieves explain-
ing, rationalising and justifying individual suffering (Illouz, 2010, 
p. 308). 
However, this relation between religion and psychology proposed by 
Illouz does not seem to be as clear as it should. On the one hand, in spite 
of the fact that psychology admits dealing with suffering, it does not make 
it explicit. On the other hand, unlike religion, psychology does not 
worry about the widow, the foreigner or the orphan, as religion did. In 
this context, religion is basically understood as Christianity (Borowitz, 
1988, p. 568). 
As Parker has noticed, psychology indirectly points out that only the 
individual is responsible for his own psychological problems and it re-
fuses any kind of political or moral approach which can contribute to 
changing the environment conditions provoking that suffering (Parker, 
2010, p. 65). Consequently, a part of suffering which is provoked by 
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external conditions is not attended to and some psychological care profes-
sionals forget the moral and political repercussions of their work.
And last but not least, even if we did have a scientific PCP suppos-
edly without moral judgments, it would still have some implicit moral 
judgments such as a concrete value of objectivity, honesty or veracity. In 
short, it is impossible to offer psychological care without moral judgments. 
Patient suffering is always linked to the social and moral context. In order 
to cope with patient suffering, it is necessary to deal with the way the 
actual patient gives meaning to the world and this always has moral and 
political implications (Reich, 1989, p. 89; Rodgers and Cowles, 1997, p. 
1049; Miller, 2005, p. 301). 
THE INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN SUFFERING AND PSYCHOLOGICAL 
CARE MODELS
The psychological theories attempted to be useful in the comprehen-
sion of suffering, but they were not able to integrate it in their schemas. 
As a subjective phenomenon, suffering is extremely difficult to turn into 
concepts (Battenfield, 1984, p. 36). This can explain why in psychologi-
cal care theories its presence is merely symbolic and trifling, as some 
authors have suggested (Urraca, 1995, p. 57; Modestin, 1986). 
According to Kuhn (1971, p. 108), one could suggest that the problem 
of some PCPs with suffering has to do with the fact that they are based 
on a paradigm which cannot deal with it properly. Szasz (1988, p. 66) 
pointed out this difficulty within the framework of Freud’s theory. Ac-
cording to this author, Freud could not integrate suffering in his theory 
because of his concept of mental structure. According to Freud, suffering 
is the result of transforming hysterical misery into ordinary misfortune 
(Freud, 1978, p. 309). In spite of the fact that Freud distinguished three 
types of unhappiness, which derived from the vulnerability of the body, 
natural disasters and the relationships among humans, he did not explic-
itly deal with it (Thompson, 2004, p. 140). It seems that suffering was 
something implicit in Freud’s work, but it was not conceived as an ex-
plicit entity.3
3  In the most reputable Spanish translation of Freud’s work the concept of suffer-
ing (sufrimiento) is not within its conceptual index (Freud, 1985, p. 257). 
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Actually, as Grant (2011) has propounded, suffering is tackled neither 
by the psychological care models nor by the psychological scientific lit-
erature. Every psychological school deals with suffering from its own 
point of view, which determines what is considered beneficial or painful 
(Tallis, 1998, 148). There are quite a few reasons which could account 
for why suffering is not an easy task for the modern psychological care 
models. 
First of all, it is not compatible with the main idea of the mind with 
which psychological care models work. Many of the modern psycho-
logical concepts were originated as a metaphor of technological processes. 
Some of them are under the effect of a mechanistic metaphor which in-
terprets mental reality as a group of impersonal forces, such as instincts, 
libido, processes, cognitions, etc. By doing this, the psychological theories 
convert suffering into a game of impersonal forces which some authors 
describe as similar to ancient animism (Sarbin, 1986, p. 10). 
Secondly, suffering cannot be used as a concept with the current psy-
chological categories because of its intrinsic conceptual difficulties. In 
other words, suffering is a subjective phenomenon which requires a 
wider approach and cannot be reduced to other categories, as psychology 
sometimes does. 
An example of this reduction is found in the DSM IV TR. The 
closer the DSM IV gets to suffering is when it proposes that people suffer 
mental disorders. It is actually suggested that people can undergo distress, 
disturbance, disorders, or suicide ideas, but suffering is not explicitly 
considered as a phenomenon (APA, 2001, XXIX). 
In spite of the fact that the DSM was not created with the intention 
of approaching suffering, certain questions do arise. Which were the 
criteria for creating it? If the PCP aim was relieving people from suffering, 
why does this criterion not appear in the classification used to work on 
it? In other words, why is not suffering the criterion for hierarchically 
organising mental disorders? The same thing that happened with grief 
(Granek, 2010), uneasiness or unhappiness (Horwitz and Wakefield, 
2007) and shyness (Lane, 2007), seems to be happening with suffering, 
which is sometimes redefined as a diagnostic category or as a mental illness 
(Tallis, 1998, p. 4). 
Thirdly, the current hedonistic spirit of society has affected how psy-
chological care theories have interpreted suffering. Any interpretation of 
suffering is related to a range of formal and informal systems that give it 
a meaning (Morris, 1991, p. 51). In Western societies, there is a wide-
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spread belief that suffering will be eradicated thanks to scientific discover-
ies and technological advances. 
But underneath this reliance on scientific progress, there lies an irra-
tional belief of people’s suffering being eliminated (Nietzsche, 2003, p. 
253). The myth of this new era is that science will eliminate suffering 
from human life. From this point of view, the scientific technology is the 
best way to put an end to it (Urraca, 1995, p. 59) and some psychologi-
cal care professionals share this faith (Bray, 2010, p. 357). But they actu-
ally forget that while there are people, there is suffering. Suffering is a 
phenomenon inherent to human life. 
Fourthly, as Urraca (1995, p. 58) suggested, the psychological research 
on suffering has focused on cognitions, perceptions, sensations and be-
haviours related to physical pain, but not on suffering as a specific phe-
nomenon. Sometimes suffering has been exclusively associated with a 
psychology focused on helping terminal patients (Bayés, 2001), as if it 
were only an object of this particular psychology, but in fact it is not. 
The clinical setting of psychology has often been concerned with specific 
pain problems, such as migraines, pre- and post- natal pain, traumatic pain 
and chronic pain, not paying enough attention to the incidence, the 
prevalence and the general involvement of suffering in the individual.
THE DIFFICULTIES OF PROFESSIONALISING THE ALLEVIATION  
OF SUFFERING
These difficulties originate from two aspects of the demanding task of 
dealing with people’s suffering. On the one hand, the fact that the indi-
vidual is really eager to professionally deal with suffering and, on the 
other hand, the fact that PCPs have to deal with suffering and at the same 
time not lose their status of scientific-based practices. 
With regard to the individual’s difficulties, it is not easy at all to deal 
with people’s grief every day. The care professional must cope with a huge 
amount of others’ suffering his whole working day. This daily contact with 
suffering can have as a result that some defense mechanisms, which try to 
avoid dealing with it directly, can appear. The case, as some authors point 
out (Miller, 2004, p. 44), may be that an implicit agreement between pro-
fessional and patient on not dealing with patient suffering can be established. 
On the one hand, the patient cannot cope with his own grief because 
he does not have enough resources to do it; and if he did, it would be too 
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painful. On the other hand, the professional does not want to be men-
tally disturbed and lose his comfort because of the patient’s suffering 
(Reich, 1989, p. 88). 
Moreover, some psychological care professionals make jokes of the 
patient’s difficulties and they justify this by arguing that it is helpful (So-
bel, 2006). Some of them are convinced this is a right way of taking a 
distance from their professional reality. But, in fact, this kind of jokes can 
affect the quality of the care relationship (Dharamsi et al., 2010, p. 534). 
As Freud proposed about the content of jokes (Freud, 1986, pp. 97-136), 
when a care professional makes a joke of the patient’s problems, he is 
damaging the patient’s confidence and the therapeutic alliance is trans-
formed into something different. 
As some authors have pointed out (Cabós-Teixidó, R., 2012, p. 242), 
may be the fact that not everybody can perform certain professions, also 
applies to psychological care. Perhaps not everybody is ready to be a 
psychological care professional; not every person can deal with other 
people’s suffering. 
With regard to the possibility of PCPs being scientific-based practices 
and at the same time deal with suffering, it is similar to what happens 
with the individual’s conditions of attending to suffering. The scientific 
aspiration of some of these PCPs has contributed to the fact that they 
forget the benefits philosophy can offer them and the link between these 
PCPs and philosophy. But in this oversight, PCPs have lost a great range 
of possibilities of dealing with suffering. 
Psychology, and within it the PCPs, has been assumed to be useful in 
clarifying psychological problems, but this must be done from a scien-
tific point of view, without philosophical concepts or considerations, 
which are in fact absolutely necessary to cope with some mental realities. 
Specifically, most of these PCPs have forgotten the value that the history 
of philosophy and practical philosophy can have, in order to alleviate and 
cope with patient suffering and be able to work with concepts related to 
it.4 The philosophical attitude, which was so essential in alleviating people’s 
grief (Laín Entralgo, 1987; Jackson, 1999, p. 10-11), has been excluded 
4  This does not mean that we are proposing that philosophy is hierarchically su-
perior to psychology. In fact, in the philosophical activity the psychological variables 
are fundamental. What we mean is that philosophy can be helpful to psychological 
care professionals and psychology in general to understand, question and approach 
some crucial issues. 
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from some PCPs because it is considered as a not very scientific-based 
practice. 
Furthermore, some psychological care professionals have forgotten 
that what is now called psychological schools has its roots in the ancient 
shamans’ wisdom, in some philosophers’ works and in the ancient 
medicine and theology (Jackson, 1999, p. 10-11). As Fromm (1985, p. 
114) noticed, some professionals think that psychology is a relatively 
modern science, because the word ‘psychology’ generally spread in the 
last 100 or 150 years. But they are forgetting that there was a psychology 
before this one, which lasted roughly from 500 b. C. until the seventeenth 
century; although it was not called ‘psychology’ but ‘ethics’ and more 
often ‘philosophy’, but it was nothing but psychology. 
The philosophical tradition provides an attitude that makes suffering 
more bearable. Philosophy helps to cope with, elaborate and overcome 
suffering. Actually, philosophy was formerly justified by itself when, 
through reasoning, it could provide meaning to sufferers (González 
García, 2006, p. 16; Melley, 1998, p. 39; Nussbaum, 2003, pp. 21-22). 
According to it, PCPs should pay attention to the history of philosophy, 
recovering and developing philosophical frameworks with which psycho-
logical care professionals can handle suffering better. 
However, in the last years there have already been some psychological 
care professionals working with philosophical approaches (Richards, 
2010; Biley, 2010; Maurer, 2010; Briedis, 2011, Roberts, 2008). Part of 
the psychological care professionals start to realise that psychological care 
particularly needs philosophy (Dalen, 2010; Christopher, 2011; Rimes, 
2011), if they want to cope with all the complexity of suffering. 
THE ALLEVIATION OF SUFFERING AS THE GOAL  
OF PSYCHOLOGICAL CARE
As we have just seen, some psychological care professionals have not 
paid enough attention to suffering. But, as we mentioned at the beginning 
of this paper, the meaning of PCPs is surely the alleviation of patient 
suffering. The relief of suffering is the main sense any psychological care 
practice must have (Eriksson, 1992, p. 119; Lindholm and Eriksson, 
1993, p. 1355). 
But this presupposes a concealed moral judgment. As it has been just 
said, it is impossible to offer any kind of psychological care without 
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moral judgments. By stating this moral judgment one should accept that 
psychological problems provoke suffering which must be attended to. It 
entails mental problems and the individual’s existence is inflicted suffering 
which can disable the individual’s autonomy (Carnevale, 2009, p. 180; 
Held, 2004). 
According to Pellegrino and Thomasma (1981, p. 123) the fact of being 
a patient with a limited autonomy sets an essential condition which cannot 
be ignored. The patient is the one who suffers: under the label of ‘patient’ 
there is a real person who is suffering. ‘Person’ stands for every individual 
who belongs to the human species (França, 2005, p. 23). As he cannot do 
it on his own, the sufferer’s condition requires that someone (in this case 
the psychological care professional) does his best to alleviate his suffering; 
both in the quality of a care professional and in the quality of a human 
being, it ethically obliges the professional to attend to the patient’s suffering, 
so that he can recover his autonomy (Reich, 1989, p. 87). 
It is clear that there is a suffering which belongs to human life and does 
not deprive the individual of his autonomy. In our opinion, this kind of 
suffering should not be the goal of psychological care practices, because 
life always implies some grade of suffering. However, what determines 
that a suffering can be PCPs’ goal is if it deprives the individual of his 
autonomy (Rawlinson, 1986, p. 59). Every psychological care profes-
sional must evaluate how the individual’s autonomy is affected by suffering. 
But this declaration of relieving the patient’s suffering must also be 
accompanied by an intention. This intention depends on the profes-
sional and must coincide with the movement which began and maintains 
this kind of practice. The intention which must be the guide of different 
PCPs is the one which actively looks for the relief of patient’s suffering. 
As Schopenhauer (2007, p. 250) said about morality, what gives moral 
and human value to PCP is considering the alleviation of patient suffering 
as a goal of its actions. In other words, the professional ability for taking 
care of patient suffering. It does not matter how, but at the very least 
the relief of suffering should be the goal of any PCP. 
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